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The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts
of Equity
Caprice L. Roberts∗
Abstract
A restitution revival is underway. Restitution and unjust enrichment
theory, born in the United States, fell out of favor here while surging in
Commonwealth countries and beyond. The American Law Institute’s (ALI)
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment streamlines the
law of unjust enrichment in a language the modern American lawyer can
understand, but it may encounter unintended problems from the law-equity
distinction.
Restitution is often misinterpreted as always equitable given its focus
on fairness. This blurs decision making on the constitutional right to a jury
trial, which "preserves" the right to a jury in federal and state cases for
"suits at common law" satisfying specified dollar amounts. Restitution
originated in law, equity, and sometimes both. The Restatement notably
attempts to untangle restitution from the law-equity labels, as well as
natural justice roots. It explicitly eschews equity’s irreparable injury
prerequisite, which historically commanded that no equitable remedy
would lie if an adequate legal remedy existed.
Can restitution law resist hearing equity’s call from the grave? Will it
avoid the pitfalls of the Supreme Court’s recent injunction cases that return
to historical, equitable principles and reanimate equity’s irreparable injury
rule? Losing anachronistic, procedural remedy barriers is welcome, but
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the Restatement must be careful to maintain the soul of unjust enrichment,
which includes flexibility, creativity, justice and morality underpinnings,
and discretion. The project’s success depends on streamlining the
language, unhinging from equity’s arcane procedures, and providing
guidance for bounded discretion.
I argue that the ALI’s groundbreaking restitution project will suffer
because it adopts language of inadequacy and affirms the hierarchy of
remedies, which prefers legal to equitable remedies. The Restatement
notably liberates all restitutionary remedies, including those emanating
from equity (e.g., constructive trusts), from demonstrating the inadequacy
of available remedies at law. This shift moves in the right direction, but
ultimately the project falls short in a provocative section that authorizes
disgorgement of profits for opportunistic breaches of contract.
The disgorgement remedy reallocates the breacher’s wrongful profit to
the plaintiff if the breach is deliberate and profitable and the contractual
entitlement inadequately protected. Disgorgement is an alternate remedy
to traditional contract damages and, notably, would apply without the
contractual breach rising to the level of a tort or breach of fiduciary duty.
The inadequacy requirement may purposefully narrow a bold, and
perhaps feared, disgorgement remedy, but it creates unnecessary confusion
by taking the focus away from the breacher’s opportunism and redirecting
the focus to the adequacy of plaintiff’s compensation. Even as the
restitution revival garners traction, inadequacy haunts this important
restitutionary remedy with equity’s ghosts.
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I. Restitution, the Elusive Merger of Law and Equity & Irreparable Injury
A restitution revival is underway in the United States.1 Scholarly
interest and cases involving the law of restitution and unjust enrichment are
increasing in the United States. International scholars, long intrigued by
restitution doctrine, are watching American developments with renewed
interest. The primary catalyst for the revival is the ALI’s restitution project,
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment.2 The
Restatement’s Reporter, Professor Andrew Kull, the ALI Restitution
Advisers, and the ALI Members Consultative Group have dedicated fifteen
years to the project.3 In May 2010, the ALI voted to approve the
Restatement, which was recently published in July 2011.
This Article addresses the extent to which equity’s ghosts will haunt
the revival. The focus will be on two particular threats: (i) Will fear of all
things equity cause total abandonment of unjust enrichment’s roots in
justice and fairness, and (ii) will equity’s nettlesome procedures undermine
the launch of an exciting new rule that provides for restitutionary
disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract? I answer yes to both
questions,4 but offer normative approaches for retaining restitution’s
historical justice roots, while exorcizing the restitutionary disgorgement
remedy from burdensome equitable prerequisites, including the irreparable
injury rule and other alternative formulations.5
1.
2.

See infra Part III (providing a full discussion of America’s restitution revival).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. In full disclosure, my initial interest in and critique of the Restatement (Third)
project began when I was an outsider to the process. In 2008, I became an elected member
of the ALI and had the good fortune to participate in the final waves of restitution revisions
as a member of the Consultative Group.
4. See infra Parts III & IV.
5. See infra Part IV.
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Why does the law-equity divide remain relevant? The complete
merger of law and equity remains elusive. Court systems are no longer
separated. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged in 1938.6 Almost
all states have merged law and equity courts.7 Students often fail to
understand the contemporary relevance of studying equity. Good-faith
efforts to teach it are inherently anachronistic. Many of the core law school
courses that traditionally covered equity have faded from the curriculum.
Value remains in appreciating America’s law and equity origins for
historical reasons alone. The import of the law-equity distinction, however,
extends beyond its historical context. Comprehension is imperative
because both federal and state constitutions hinge the right to a jury trial on
the distinction. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to trial by jury in certain civil cases: "In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law."8 The Court has not incorporated the
Seventh Amendment jury trial right to the states by means of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nevertheless, state constitutions have analogous guarantees.9
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment’s introductory
clause, "In Suits at common law," to provide a right to trial by jury if the
right to trial by jury existed at common law.10 If, instead, a judge sitting in
equity historically handled the matter, then there was no right to a jury trial.
The judge-jury issue turns on "whether the case before [the court] is one
that would have been brought at law or in equity in 1791."11 Thus, the lawequity distinction is dispositive.
Unfortunately, determining whether the remedy is legal or equitable is
no simple task. Many urge the adoption of a functional test that would

6. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s note.
7. For example, Virginia held out until 2006. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1. Delaware
continues to retain its separate Chancery court system.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
State constitutional language usually differs from the federal Seventh Amendment’s, but the
law-equity distinction remains for states’ constitutional jury trial rights.
10. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998)
(finding a right to jury trial in federal copyright actions based on historical English practice).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a.
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examine the nature and purpose of the remedy.12 Accordingly, if plaintiff,
for example, seeks compensatory damages, her remedy is legal and triggers
a jury trial right on seeking the requisite constitutional monetary amount.
In contrast, if plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the remedy is equitable and
determined by a judge. Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence follows a
more cumbersome, less predictable path.13 In an opinion authored by
Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court applied a history-plus-remedy test: the
nature of the cause of action and the remedy sought.14 In Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures,15 Justice Thomas decided that the Court could not avoid
the constitutional jury trial right issue via statutory interpretation of the
Copyright Act16 and ultimately found that a constitutional right to a jury
trial existed based on the history of copyright actions and their
corresponding remedies.17 Thus, students and lawyers have to study and
12. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES &
MATERIALS 346 (8th ed., 2011) ("There is constant pressure to utilize the remedies test for
the parties’ right to a jury trial. That test is more practical and easier to apply."); Chauffeurs
v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572–80 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (advocating a remedies
test); see also Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991)
(maintaining that the legal or equitable nature of the remedy sought is the "more important"
part of the analysis); Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 337 (2d Cir. 2005) (giving more
weight to the remedies test); C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136,
1143 (Cal. 1978) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basic rule should be that no jury is
required when plaintiff seeks equitable relief rather than ‘legal’ damages. That approach
requires no complex, historical research regarding when and by whom certain rights were
created. It also requires less reliance on the anomalies of England’s unique juridical
history.").
13. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 345 (explaining the shift in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the jury trial issue from "a more practical and simpler
criterion of whether the plaintiff’s demand seeks money" in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 476–79 (1962), to a three-part test in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)). The
three relevant considerations, according to the Court in Ross, were (1) the particular cause of
action’s history before law and equity merged, (2) the type of relief sought, and (3) the jury’s
practical ability to resolve the issues. Id. at 538 n.10. Later, the Court seemingly abandoned
Ross’s third factor—the jury’s practical ability—and moved to a two-part analysis of the
"nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought." See Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97 ("First,
we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England
prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature."); see also Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355
(claiming to "examine both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought," but
devoting the bulk of analysis to the history of the action).
14. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355.
15. Id. at 340.
16. Id. at 345, 352.
17. Ironically, the defendant had requested the jury trial, but would have been better
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research the law-equity distinction as it directly affects a pivotal matter in
lawsuits—whether the parties will have a right to a jury trial.18
Merger remains elusive in part because of the jury trial right issue, but
also due to the remnants of equitable tests that continue to operate as
prerequisites for access to certain remedies. The irreparable injury test
commands that no equitable remedy will flow if adequate legal remedy
exists.19 This test is oft repeated but rarely understood or applied
consistently.20 The intractable hold of the irreparable injury rule and the
rhetoric of inadequacy may muddy the waters for the rollout of the new
Restatement.
II. The Irreparable Injury Rule Is Dead. Long Live the Irreparable
Injury Rule.
Two decades ago, Professor Laycock provocatively declared the death
of the irreparable injury rule.21 This conclusion rested on his realist
evaluation of vast remedies caselaw.22 Professor Laycock diligently
compiled and dissected the cases in a law review article,23 which he

off with the trial judge’s statutory award of damages ($8.8 million, at $20,000 per 440
episode violations), id. at 344, rather than what the jury ultimately awarded ($31.68 million,
at $70,000 multiplied by 440 acts of infringement). See Columbia Pictures Television v.
Krypton Broad., Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2002).
18. For a useful critique of the law-equity reasoning, see Tomás Gómez-Arostegui,
The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010).
19. See The Changing Limits of Injunctive Relief, 78 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1965)
("Few legal rubrics can vie in frequency of use with the maxim that equity will not grant
specific relief—injunction or specific performance of contracts—when there exists any
adequate remedy at law."); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 266–69
(describing the history and persistence of the traditional maxim, "the plaintiff’s inadequate
legal remedy, irreparable injury").
20. See Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1642, 1649 (1992) ("The words irreparable, injury, and inadequate became transmogrified
into idiom and lost their ordinary meaning in the vernacular.").
21. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.
687, 692 (1990).
22. Id. at 701.
23. Id.
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subsequently expanded into a now-seminal book, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule.24
He meticulously analyzed hundreds of cases to establish that the
irreparable injury rule "does not describe what cases do, and it cannot
account for the results."25 Professor Laycock asserted that the rule
"highlights the obsolete distinction between law and equity, and
subordinates more functional schemes for classifying remedies."26 He
further explained that the rule does not operate as a genuine prerequisite.
Rather, according to Professor Laycock, "Injunctions are routine, and
damages are never adequate unless the court wants them to be."27 His
evidence demonstrated that other reasons and rules actually motivate the
court decisions. He admitted, however, that "when courts invoke these
rules, they often go on to invoke the irreparable injury rule as well."28
Accordingly, Professor Laycock advised that "[a]nalysis would be
both simpler and clearer if we abandoned the rhetoric of irreparable injury
and spoke solely and directly of the real reasons for choosing remedies."29 I
agree with that prescription, which is no less needed today than it was
twenty years ago. Further, Professor Laycock rightly sought "to complete
the assimilation of equity, and to eliminate the last remnant of the
conception that equity is subordinate, extraordinary, or unusual." Not all
scholars agree with the goal of equalizing the remedial playing field to
include non-preferential treatment for legal versus equitable remedies.30
The complete assimilation goal should garner broad support. Ultimately,
Professor Laycock urged switching from the law-equity framing to a
functional analysis: "[I]s the remedy specific or substitutionary, is it a
personal command or an impersonal judgment, is it preliminary or
24. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991).
25. Laycock, supra note 21, at 692.
26. Id. at 769.
27. Id. at 692.
28. Id. at 693.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 20, at 1642 (reviewing Professor Laycock’s
book). For two other thoughtful pieces on the meaning of inadequacy and the irreparable
injury rule before and after Professor Laycock’s obituary of the rule, see Doug Rendleman,
Irreparability Resurrected? Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the
Warren Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2002) and
Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 346 (1981); see also JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 21 (2006)
(maintaining that Professor Laycock called time of death too early).
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permanent? On the facts of each case, does plaintiff’s preferred remedy
impose unnecessary costs, or undermine substantive or procedural
policies?"31
Overall, Professor Laycock’s proof of the rule’s lack of descriptive or
predictive value is compelling. But the irreparable injury rule, along with
its inadequacy prerequisite, is not dead. In my opinion, the rule is not alive
and well but, rather, rattles about like the undead. Lip service and rhetoric
persist. Confusion continues. Even the Supreme Court is part of the
problem. The ALI seeks to be part of the assimilation solution,32 but the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment runs the risk of
exacerbating the confusion by utilizing an inadequacy inquiry in its new
rule permitting disgorgement for opportunistic breaches of contract.33
This temptation for confusion is heightened by the Supreme Court’s
resurrection of the irreparable injury rule and the inadequacy-of-legalremedies test.
Despite progress on the merger of law and equity, the Supreme
Court’s recent foray into the law of injunctions represents a move
backwards.34 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,35 and its progeny,36
the Supreme Court reanimated irreparability and inadequacy as hurdles—
two separate hurdles in fact—to the equitable remedy of injunction.37 In
31. Laycock, supra note 21, at 693.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4.
33. Id. § 39.
34. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s remedies analysis all too often falls short on
its doctrinal purity. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980)
(approving restitutionary disgorgement via a constructive trust remedy without a proper
doctrinal foundation—operating as if the former CIA agent had breached his fiduciary duty
when he, in fact, breached only the prepublication clearance clause of his contract); see also
Caprice L. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 956 n.53 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s
doctrine-to-remedy analysis in Snepp). The author will analyze the Court’s remedies
failures in a forthcoming manuscript.
35. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (finding
courts must apply the "traditional four-part test" in deciding whether to grant permanent
injunctions in patent cases).
36. See Monsanto v. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2759 (2010) (finding that
the lower courts failed to properly apply a four-part test in granting permanent injunction
against manufacturer of genetically engineered alfalfa during course of federal agency’s
environmental impact study); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32–33 (2008)
(overturning preliminary injunction against Navy sonar testing after finding NRDC had
failed to prove likelihood of irreparable harm to marine mammals).
37. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (identifying "irreparable injury" and "inadequacy" as
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eBay, the Court considered what level of discretion would be appropriate
for a court to exercise in granting or denying permanent injunctive relief
for a proven patent violation.38 The district court had denied the
injunction on the basis of failure to demonstrate irreparable injury: "[I]t
concluded that a ‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack
of commercial activity in practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to
establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if an
injunction did not issue."39 The federal appellate court granted the
permanent injunction as a matter of automatic entitlement based on the
proven patent violation: "The court articulated a ‘general rule,’ unique to
patent disputes, ‘that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement
and validity have been adjudged.’"40
Ultimately, the eBay Court found that both the federal district and
appellate courts erred in failing to "fairly" apply the "four-factor test
historically employed by courts of equity"—the same test "[o]rdinarily"
applied by "a federal court considering whether to award permanent relief
to a prevailing plaintiff."41 In rigid fashion, the Court reset the equitable
table by cementing the required analysis:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking
a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court
may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.42

Without explicating the quantum of proof required for the four factors, the
Court simply ruled that both lower courts did not fairly apply the factors
due to their categorical leanings in opposite directions. The Court
reasoned that both lower courts faltered by rigidly conducting the
equitable analysis: "Just as the District Court erred in its categorical
two of the salient factors for consideration).
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id. at 393 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711
(E.D. Va. 2003)), vacated, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
40. Id. at 393–94 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
41. Id. at 390.
42. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
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denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical
grant of such relief."43 Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated the court
of appeals’ judgment and remanded to the district court so that the district
court could conduct the four-factor analysis and determine whether a
permanent injunction should issue in the particular case.44 The Court
explicitly declined to indicate whether injunctive relief should be
granted.45
Most notably, the Court failed to provide any meaningful guidance on
the interpretation of the irreparable injury factor and the (strangely) separate
inadequate-legal-remedies factor.
The Court did state the classic
inadequacy question for the second factor: "Whether monetary damages
are inadequate to compensate for that injury."46 It is no wonder that, on
remand, the federal district court reached its original conclusion, to deny
injunctive relief on the basis of lack of irreparable injury.47 The district
court lamented the lack of guidance on the quantum of proof required for
satisfying the irreparable injury factor.48
The Supreme Court echoed and extended the remedial lockstep
hurdles in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council49 and Monsanto v.
Geertson Seed Farms.50 In Winter, the Court extended the eBay framework
to a preliminary injunction beyond the intellectual property context. The
Winter plaintiffs alleged irreparable environmental harm from Navy sonar

43. Id. at 394.
44. Id. As it turns out, on remand, the district court went through the motions of the
four-factor test, but again declined to grant plaintiff an injunction. MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 (E.D. Va. 2007). The district court limited its
injunction holding by stating that its "determination that MercExchange fails to establish
irreparable harm is based upon facts specific to this case and not broad classifications or
categorical exclusions of certain types of patent holders." Id. at 570. The court noted,
"Although the ‘quantum of evidence’ required to prove irreparable harm remains unclear,
the potential for loss of market share is insufficient to establish the same; otherwise a
scenario would never arise where an injunction would not issue." Id. at 577.
45. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
46. Id. at 391.
47. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
48. Id. at 577.
49. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (assessing
propriety of injunctive relief to protect marine wildlife from sonar damage).
50. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010)
(applying the "traditional" four-factor test in overturning trial court’s grant of a permanent
injunction to remedy a proven National Environmental Policy Act violation) (quoting eBay).
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testing.51 The Supreme Court found the lower court’s irreparability
standard in error because the court awarded an injunction based on a
"possibility," rather than a "likelihood," of irreparable harm.52 Ultimately,
the Court found the grant of a preliminary injunction in error because of the
incorrectly applied lower standard for risk of harm, the tip of the balance of
the equities in the Navy’s favor, and the disservice of the public interest if
the injunction issued.53
It was news to remedies and injunctions scholars that the four-factor
test was the required "traditional," "ordinarily" applied, familiar test;
scholars "consider the Court’s four-point test to be new."54 Courts have
historically utilized many balancing techniques in evaluating whether to
grant equitable relief, including sliding scale tests.55 Scholars and courts
may now follow the Court’s edict and apply the four-factor test for
intellectual property injunctions and beyond. Analyses and criticisms
abound,56 however, and at least one scholar argues that the four factors
51. Winter, 129 U.S. at 371.
52. Id. at 375.
53. Id. at 381.
54. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 273.
55. See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
973, 976 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (declaring that a movant seeking a disfavored injunction
"must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and
with regard to the balance of harms, and may not rely on our modified likelihood-of-successon-the-merits standard"). This modified standard requires a movant who makes a weaker
showing of likelihood of success on the merits to make a strong showing that the balance of
irreparable injury favors her. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 33 ("[C]ourts have evaluated claims
for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ sometimes awarding relief based on a lower
likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very high") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
It is unclear whether sliding scale tests will survive after eBay and Winter. See id. ("This
Court has never rejected [a sliding scale] formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.")
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Other courts continue to use a balancing test for the success-onthe-merits factor. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[P]laintiff
[must] demonstrate[] ‘either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance
of the hardships tipping decidedly in the [plaintiff]’s favor.") (emphasis added).
56. See generally James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555 (2010); Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable
Decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597 (2010); J.
Scott Larson, The Unsettled Aftereffects of eBay and Survey of Its Continued US Litigation
Impact, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5 (2010); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher
Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67 (2009); Tracy Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 187 (2008).
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should be affirmative defenses, with the burden on the defendant to plead
and prove them.57
It remains to be seen whether the Court’s reanimation of the
irreparable injury and inadequacy prerequisites will filter through
decisionmaking regarding all equitable remedies. The disgorgement
remedy for breach of contract runs a peculiar risk because, although the
Restatement declares the remedy legal, its incorporation of inadequacy
rhetoric may result in the remedy being hoisted by its own pétard.
III. Restitution Revival and the Shackles of Equity
A. Restitution in a Global Context
According to lore, the United States gave birth to the law of unjust
enrichment. Credit for this title is owed, at least in part, to the ALI’s first
restatement project on restitution released in 1937.58 The philosophical
roots of restitution, however, predate the first restatement contribution.
Long before the ALI put pen to paper, the law recognized the maxim that
you cannot reap what another sows.59 Still, the first restatement offered a
blackletter, compiled bedrock for the development of restitution
jurisprudence. With the inaugural restitution work, combined with
Palmer’s treatise,60 the law of restitution seemed set to blossom. In the
decades following 1937, however, the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment thrived internationally, especially in Commonwealth countries,
but waned in the United States.61
Interest in and understanding of restitution has faded in the United
States. Commonwealth scholars are engaged in vigorous debate about the
contours of restitution’s doctrinal scope.62 They are leading the charge for
57. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LIT. 63 (2008).
58. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].
59. See A.P. v I.N.S., 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918) (characterizing defendant’s
unauthorized behavior as an unfair business practice where defendant "is endeavoring to
reap where it has not sown").
60. See generally GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
61. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (3d ed. 2011); Chaim Saiman,
Restitution in America: Why the U.S. Refuses to Join in the Global Restitution Party, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100–02 (2008) [hereinafter Saiman, Restitution in America].
62. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 34, at 968–90.
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the advancement of the modern law of restitution. Sadly, by comparison,
the contemporary American lawyer, especially a recent graduate, may have
little to no comprehension of restitution law. Modern American lawyers, if
prompted, may have a dim recollection of their Contracts professor
introducing the quasi-contract fiction of creating an exchange of promises
in order to return the parties to the status quo ante63—for example,
returning money paid for no return consideration64—or awarding quantum
meruit65 for services rendered under an unenforceable contract.66 American
courts have continued to issue restitutionary rulings but, all too often, the
doctrinal logic is utterly absent,67 the terminology misstated,68 and the law
misconstrued.69 All hope is not lost, however, for American lawyers and
scholars to revive their interest in restitution law.
63. Status quo ante means "to return the parties to the positions they held prior to any
exchange." Professor Perillo argues that if restitution has the goal of restoring the status
quo, it would allow, when the contract is invalid, a restitution remedy for the cost of
performing or preparing to perform. Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context
and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1007 (2011).
64. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 314 (N.Y. 1972)
(permitting boat seller to recover expected profit as a lost volume seller, offset by a return of
plaintiff’s down payment).
65. Quantum meruit means literally "as much as he deserves" or "the reasonable value
of one’s services."
66. See, e.g., Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 1834 WL 1176, at *9 (N.H. 1834).
67. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
68. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 493–94 (outlining numerous
restitution equitable fallacies uttered by courts).
69. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1993) (describing
restitution—incompletely—as "a remedy traditionally viewed as ‘equitable’" and
emphasizing—misleadingly—that "‘equitable relief’ can also refer to those categories of
relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution,
but not compensatory damages)"); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (lamenting the Court’s muddled ERISA jurisprudence regarding
federal "equitable" remedies and calling for the Court or Congress to forge a fresh remedial
structure in order to remedy the colossal misunderstanding and injustices that would
otherwise flow to plaintiffs under existing caselaw). But cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–17, 218 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J.) (noting properly the
difference between legal restitution and equitable restitution, but unfortunately utilizing the
incorrect term of "damages" for Great-West’s freestanding restitution claim for monetary
relief); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Serv., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 357 (2006) (describing
accurately the fiduciary’s claim for a constructive trust or equitable lien as "equitable"
restitution). For a thoughtful analysis of Justice Antonin Scalia’s contribution to restitution
jurisprudence, see generally Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1063 (2003). Although errors abound on both the federal and state level, there
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Leading up to and coinciding with the recent Restatement project,
American scholarly interest in restitution has been on the rise. Significant
contributions include the seminal works of Professors Andrew Kull,70 Allan
Farnsworth,71 Jack Dawson,72 Doug Rendleman,73 Jim Rogers,74 Peter
Linzer,75 and Mel Eisenberg.76 Other important contributions did not shy
away from the intricate study that restitution law demands across
disciplines, such as the work of Professor Candace Kovacic-Fleischer in
family law,77 Professor Emily Sherwin in varied areas,78 and Professor Sid
are numerous court opinions that correctly distinguish legal restitution from equitable restitution.
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the
distinction and finding a jury trial proper for the legal restitution at issue).
70. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement
of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021 (2001); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1191 (1995).
71. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985). Although Professor Farnsworth
disfavored a robust disgorgement remedy for contract law, his treatment remains seminal. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists the three remedial goals of contract law as the
expectation, reliance, and restitution interests. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344
(1981). It notably does not include any reference to a disgorgement interest. Professor Eisenberg
maintains that this omission is "plainly deliberate" and tracks Reporter Professor Farnsworth’s
normative stance against recognition of the disgorgement interest in contract law. Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 561 (2006).
72. John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 56 (1981).
73. Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2011); Doug
Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 933 (2008); Doug Rendleman, When Is Enrichment Unjust? Restitution Visits an Onyx
Bathroom, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 991 (2003); Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the
Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped off Dawson’s Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2001); Doug
Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get
in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999).
74. James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55 (2007).
75. Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and
Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695 (2001).
76. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 561. Professor Eisenberg provides detailed case support
for disgorgement, demonstrates disgorgement’s ability to foster efficiency and promise-keeping
goals, and compellingly argues "that contract law should and does protect the disgorgement
interest." Id. at 562.
77. Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L.
REV. 547 (1986); Candace S. Kovacic, Applying Restitution to Remedy a Discriminatory Denial
of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743 (1983).
78. See generally Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Creditors, 27 REV. LITIG. 141
(2008), reprinted in UNJUST ENRICHMENT (G. Radhika, ed. 2008); Emily Sherwin, Love,
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DeLong regarding disgorgement’s application in practice.79 I have found
the field fertile ground for scholarship,80 and have also benefitted from
recent thoughtful treatments by Professors Colleen Murphy,81 Chaim
Saiman,82 and Eoin O’Dell.83 These works show a resurgence of interest
and appreciation for the import of restitution law, as well as significant
disagreement about its interpretation and reach.
All of this scholarship and the rollout of the new Restatement will
contribute to the restitution revival in the United States. As momentum
continues, the American voice of restitution will regain a place in the global
debate about the proper application and scope of the law of restitution and
unjust enrichment.
B. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
The ALI approved the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment in May of 201084 and published the work in July 2011. Law
Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (2006);
Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1443 (2004); Emily
Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79
TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001).
79. Sidney W. DeLong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract, 22 IND. L. REV. 737 (1989).
80. Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in
Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653 (2010); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary
Disgorgement as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract, 77 U. CINN. L. REV. 991 (2009);
Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 34; Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary
Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 131 (2008).
81. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, What Is Specific about "Specific Restitution"?,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (2009); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55
SMU L. REV. 1577 (2002).
82. See generally Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993 (2008); Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America, supra note 61;
Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Study in Contemporary Common Law
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487 (2007).
83. See generally Eoin O’Dell, Spies Like Us? Frank Snepp and George Blake:
Freedom of Speech and Restitutionary Remedies (Feb. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/26638068/O-Dell-CLP-Paper. Another interesting
contribution is Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A
Disgorgement Theory of Remedies, 52 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1221 (2011), but the
authors’ omission of the Restatement’s Section 39 is difficult to understand.
84. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Current Projects: Restatement Third, Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&project
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reform projects are not for the weary. This particular project occupied the
unenviable position of updating a body of law not captured in restatement
blackletter since the first restatement of restitution from 1937.85 The
second restatement effort never garnered approval. Now, after ten years of
labor, critique, and refinement, the Restatement (Third) will make its
official debut this year. The Restitution Rollout conference is part of a
continued effort to introduce the new Restatement to the curiosity and
candor of the professional world.86
This Restatement will help revive the American soul of restitution. It
has already reengaged a dialogue among American scholars,
Commonwealth scholars, and beyond.87 The new Restatement will stir
revival by streamlining a complex body of law into a language the modern
lawyer can understand. Ideally, it will serve as a catalyst for a return of
freestanding law school courses in restitution and unjust enrichment.88
id=14 ("The final Tentative Draft of this project was approved at the 2010 Annual Meeting,
subject to the discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative . . . . Approval cleared
the way for publication of the official text of this project, which is expected in summer
2011.") (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST).
86. Doug Rendleman first applied this famous phrase to the Restatement as part of our
Restitution Revival panel description at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
conference in 2010.
87. Numerous panels and conferences in the United States have recently focused on
restitution and the Restatement (Third), including Washington and Lee University School of
Law’s Restitution Roundtable and Restitution Rollout Symposium, the American
Association of Law Schools’ Remedies Section, the Remedies Forum in Aix-en-Provence,
France, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and the International Contracts
Conference at the University of Nevada–Las Vegas and Stetson University.
88. Although the Restitution course is a staple in Commonwealth jurisdictions, the
course lost favor in the American curriculum. Many of the lions in American academia once
taught Restitution, but the course has all but vanished. Restitution remains a strong research
interest of American scholars, but only a couple of law schools have current course offerings
in restitution. For example, Professor Kull teaches Restitution at Boston University, and
Professor Doug Laycock has offered a seminar in restitution at the University of Michigan
and the University of Virginia. Many American law professors attempt to cover for the
course’s absence by teaching a healthy component of unjust enrichment law in the Remedies
course. This solution is not ideal, however, for at least two reasons: (i) Remedies centers
students’ study on the various avenues to judicial relief rather than the underlying
substantive law, while incorporating a segment on restitution requires teaching the freestanding unjust enrichment cause of action in addition to the variety of restitutionary
remedies that may flow from doctrinal claims in unjust enrichment, contract, tort,
intellectual property, fiduciary duty, and beyond; and (ii) the typical three-hour Remedies
course has to do much heavy lifting in order to ensure students gain a capstone experience
integrating review of vast bodies of underlying doctrine, learn new remedies and limits for
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The complex history of restitution and its disappearance from the
American legal landscape require the Restatement to do yeoman’s work.
The project, like all ALI efforts, must restate the law. But it also must do
much more. The Restatement must reorganize, synthesize, translate, and
redirect the future of restitution law towards its best aims and with
appropriate limits.
First and foremost, the Restatement grounds American law onto one
center stage. Simply put, "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense
of another is subject to liability in restitution."89 Liability may stem from
one or more underlying substantive causes of action, including, but not
limited to, contract, tort, fiduciary duty, securities fraud, trademark
infringement, and unjust enrichment. Restitution remedies include monies
returned,90 items returned,91 quantum meruit, accounting for profits,
disgorgement, and constructive trusts.
C. Equity’s Ghosts Haunting Restitution
The ghosts of equity loom over unjust enrichment and restitution law.
Equitable ghosts may even threaten the success of the project. Restitution
has a sordid past because it has existed remedially as legal, equitable, and
sometimes both.92 One should not mistakenly assume that restitution
both public and private remedies, appreciate the continuing import of the law-equity divide,
and prepare for practice as well as bar exams.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1. Even this simple statement is not without controversy.
For example, the requirement that the enrichment be "at the expense of another" raises
concerns because the phrase may confine unjust enrichment recovery to a narrower set of
cases than courts have permitted. Doug Rendleman and I hypothetically explore this
foreseeable, definitional problem:
Suppose the defendant diverted a benefit which would otherwise have gone to
the plaintiff. The court may simply ignore the supposed requirement that the
defendant’s enrichment must be at the plaintiff’s expense. Or the court may find
the intercepting defendant unjustly enriched at the ‘expense of’ the plaintiff and
order the defendant’s ‘restitution’ of something the plaintiff never had.
RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 472–73.
90. Technically, money "had and received."
91. Technically, replevin or "specific restitution."
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(1) ("Liabilities and remedies within the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment may have originated in law, in equity, or in a combination
of the two."); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 473–95 (discussing the
law-equity distinction at various points).
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liability or remedies are inherently equitable.93
Despite repeated
clarification, the lure of such a misconception is strong. The very
foundation of restitution—unjust enrichment—includes the word "unjust,"
which summons forth notions of equitable fairness, equitable discretion,
and natural justness. Lord Mansfield famously characterized general
assumpsit, now called restitution, in an equitable frame:
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice,
to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the
equity of the plaintiff’s case, as it were upon a contract ("quasi ex
contractu," as the Roman law expresses it) . . . .
In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice
and equity to refund the money.94

These unjustjustice and equitytrappings simultaneously display
beauty95 while threatening an early demise of the American restitution
revival.
Beauty exists in the ability of restitution doctrine to adapt and aid
cases with unusual fact patterns and unforeseen circumstances.96 The
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a (stating the purpose of § 4(1) "is to warn
against the common misconception that liabilities or remedies described in terms of ‘unjust
enrichment’ are necessarily equitable in origin").
94. Moses v. MacFerlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.) 678, 681 (emphasis added);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. b (quoting and discussing Lord Mansfield’s
announcement in Moses of a restitution theory of liability in equitable terms). In a mistaken
improvements case, Joseph Story similarly grounded restitution recovery on natural justice
and equity: "‘[J]ure naturae aequum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri
locupletiorem’ (It is a principle of natural justice and equity, that no one be enriched through
loss and injury to another)." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. b (describing Story’s
reliance on this Latin maxim from Roman law and noting that he "was evidently prepared to
bypass the English authorities altogether" to attain relief through unjust enrichment) (quoting
Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127 (C.C.D. Me. 1841); see also Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames
and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 297, 313–16
(2005) (exploring Story’s influence in grounding the American law of unjust enrichment on
Roman sources).
95. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 474–77, (exploring the French
decision, Patureau-Miran C. Boudier, Cass. Req., 15 June 1892 [S.1893.1.28], as translated
from the decision in JACK BEATSON & ELTJO SCHRANGE, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 39–42);
id. at 477 (describing the French version of unjust enrichment—the action of de in rem
verso—as a "supple and elastic doctrine," which holds that "no-one should enrich himself at
the expense of another without just cause; for equity does not permit it") (emphasis added
and internal citations omitted).
96. Louis E. Wolcher, Intent to Charge for Unsolicited Benefits Conferred in an
Emergency: A Case Study in the Meaning of "Unjust" in the Restatement (Third) of
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doctrine is flexible and may constitute a fail-safe avenue for a remedy. For
example, restitution survives statute of frauds problems that bar traditional
breach of contract actions.97 The law of unjust enrichment and restitution
has foundational grounding in Aristotelian justice98 and, thus, can achieve
corrective justice results. Some scholars celebrate and embrace these
traditions and features.99 The new Restatement, in contrast, proceeds with
extreme caution and an explicit voice of departure.
The Restatement offers at least two critical maneuvers to exorcize
equity’s ghosts. It situates the intended path for American restitution within
the positivist, rather than the natural law, tradition. The drafters allay
anticipated American fears: unjust enrichment and restitution law eschews
open-ended natural law in favor of grounded, principled, positive law
doctrinal boundaries.100 Accordingly, the first maneuver notably occurs
immediately out of the gates in Section 1 to set the proper framing. This
explicit dismissal of justice and morality underpinnings garners criticism.101
I hope the Restatement will foster the restitution revival and
specifically reignite the soul of restitution in American law. I fear that a
complete abandonment of the historical roots of justice represents a
sanitization of an essential, soulful component of restitution. Fortunately,
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911 (2011); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a ("The chameleon-like qualities of the term "restitution"
permits its invocation in a variety of circumstances where the legal or equitable nature of a
given remedy may not be apparent.").
97. See Boone v. Coe, 154 S.W. 900, 902 (Ky. 1913) (barring plaintiffs relying
heavily on an oral agreement and no improvements, but noting the restitution exception for
other cases).
98. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (stating that the "‘restitution interest,’ involving a
combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for
relief" if the purpose is Aristotelian justice, in which the law’s aim is to maintain "an
equilibrium of goods among members of society").
99. See, e.g., Wolcher, supra note 96; Peter Linzer & Donna L. Huffman, Unjust
Impoverishment: Using Restitution Reasoning in Today’s Mortgage Crisis, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 949 (2011) (arguing that scholars should view restitution law’s ability to address a
plaintiff’s "unjust impoverishment" as a key characteristic distinguishing it from the other
principal bodies of law).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. b ("The concern of restitution is not . . . with
unjust enrichment in any broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to
what is more appropriately called unjustified enrichment. Compared to . . . ‘unjust
enrichment,’ instances of unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively
determined . . . .").
101. See generally Linzer & Huffman, supra note 99; Wolcher, supra note 96.
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these fears may go unrealized due to the gravitational pull of unjust
enrichment’s history and rhetoric. Notwithstanding the Restatement’s
immediate disavowal of unjust enrichment’s historical and moral
foundation, the strong roots cannot be so easily cut. Even the Restatement
offers mixed signals elsewhere throughout its text, showing a visible
attraction to unjust enrichment’s moral underpinnings.
For example, the disgorgement of profits remedy for opportunistic
breach of contract contains multiple moral undertones, speaking of
"opportunistic" action,102 "conscious wrongdoing,"103 and "conscious taking
without asking."104 The disgorgement section elevates certain breaches of
contract from the amoral, or even efficient, frame to the language of unjust
enrichment, paralleling tort doctrine.
Per the Restatement, the
disgorgement remedy would operate to disgorge wrongful gains from a
blameworthy breaching party because it would be unjust to retain such
opportunistic benefits.105 As I have written elsewhere, the Restatement’s
rhetorical flourish may have a broader reach than intended106 but, on the
whole, operationalizing the disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach
of contract is a positive development.107 In order for the remedy to be
successful, it will be critical to establish the appropriate doctrinal
boundaries, which will include deciding which contractual breach behavior
is worthy of deterrence via profit-stripping. With appropriate boundaries,
keeping a lifeline open to unjust enrichment’s roots will provide a useful
method for encouraging promise-keeping and deterring opportunism. This
path requires careful attention to reasoned discretion with permissible
reliance on principles of fairness, without fairness automatically triggering
the equity misconception for all restitution liability and remedies.
The new Restatement explicitly seeks to escape the shackles of equity
in another section. This second maneuver jettisons the equitable irreparable
injury rule and inadequacy prerequisite: "A claimant otherwise entitled to a
remedy for unjust enrichment, including a remedy originating in equity,
need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at law."108 The
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39.
103. Id. § 39 cmt. b.
104. See id. (targeting a breaching party who "takes without asking").
105. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
106. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 80, at 1006.
107. See id. at 1026 ("But, in the end, a Trojan horse is a bad thing only if you want the
Greeks to lose.").
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(2); see also id. § 4 cmt. a (justifying the explicit call for
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Restatement’s purpose is to correct the misconception that restitution and
unjust enrichment are necessarily equitable.109 It further seeks to rectify the
faulty conclusion that leads courts to dismiss restitution claims because an
adequate remedy exists at law.110 Shedding the inadequacy ghosts may not
prove to be easy. The inadequacy of remedies at law is a judicial "slogan"
that persists despite the disappearance of its original justification.111 Thus,
the lure of rhetoric and old habits remains. And what if the restitutionary
remedy is actually equitable?112
Accurate law-equity characterization is often elusive.113 Disgorgement
is no exception. As a remedy, disgorgement has equitable roots.
Definitive, consistent categorization, however, is lacking. Most often,
courts have designated the disgorgement remedy as equitable.114 This
determination may hinge on the history of the underlying cause of action, as
well as the historical tie to the remedy of accounting for profits, a classic
equitable remedy. The new Restatement offers a functional clarification for
determining classification: "If restitution to the claimant is accomplished
exclusively by a judgment for money, without resort to any of the ancillary
erasing the inadequacy prerequisite: "An argument to the contrary should appear antiquated
today, but § 4(2) is included to remove any doubt.").
109. See id. § 4 cmt. c ("The most widespread error is the assertion that a claim in
restitution or unjust enrichment is by its nature equitable rather than legal.").
110. See id. ("From this false premise [that restitution is naturally equitable] a court
may conclude . . . that the claim in question may be dismissed because the plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law. . . . [This] conclusion is simply wrong.").
111. See id. § 4 cmt. e. (acknowledging that courts continue to recite the inadequacy
test even though the "old slogan no longer explains what judges do"). The Restatement notes
the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice that Professor Laycock demonstrated in The
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule: courts denying specific performance in contracts cases
"continue to recite that the test is the adequacy of legal remedies," but "a reason can usually
be found in independent and identifiable (if unacknowledged) limits to the propriety of the
remedy in a particular case." Id.
112. The Restatement shuns the inadequacy prerequisite even if the restitutionary
remedy is unquestionably equitable like the constructive trust remedy. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 4 cmt. e. The final, published Restatement’s comment on the inadequacy test
declares that "the Restatement does not propose to revive it." Id.
113. See Merex, A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 823–26 (2d Cir.
1994) (explaining that the contract doctrine of promissory estoppel, which postdates Seventh
Amendment ratification, "eludes classification as either entirely legal or entirely equitable").
114. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998)
(noting that defendants, who asserted that statutory damages for copyright infringement were
"clearly equitable," failed to analogize to historical causes of action, "including those actions
for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable, such as actions for
disgorgement of improper profits") (emphasis added).
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remedial devices traditionally available in equity but not at law, the remedy
is presumptively legal."115
Historically, disgorgement flowed as a result of an equitable
"accounting to capture profits and force proof from the defendant."116 In
this vein, modern disgorgement commonly flows from a fiduciary breach,
and the disgorgement remedy "forces the fiduciary defendant to disgorge
gains received from improper use of the plaintiff’s property or
entitlements."117 The implication of this equitable categorization for breach
of contract cases without a fiduciary component—like opportunistic breach
in the Restatement—is unclear. Disgorgement’s roots in accounting (a
remedy ancillary to injunctive relief) possess a clear equitable frame:
"Equity traditionally took jurisdiction to enforce such an accounting
because there was a substantive equitable duty to account on the part of the
fiduciary."118 As such, disgorgement arguably operates coercively as an
order on the defendant like traditional equitable remedies that offer a basis
Another rationale supporting an
for contempt upon disobedience.119
equitable classification is that disgorgement, regardless of the nature of the
underlying cause of action, does not work like traditional contract damages
that compensate the plaintiff for her loss.120 Rather, disgorgement strips
defendant’s wrongful gain and, thus, may appear as an equitable personal
order, commanding specific conduct of the defendant.121 If equitable,
disgorgement would notably be a matter of judicial discretion.
Case law also supports an equitable classification for disgorgement,
but the cases have doctrinal causes of action distinct from breach of
contract. A Supreme Court opinion dealing with remedies under the
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. d. This functional approach, although preferred by
remedies scholars, is not the sole test under the "nature and purpose" framework the
Supreme Court has adopted. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (recognizing the "‘general rule’
that monetary relief is legal").
116. 1 DAN A. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(5), at
609–10 (2d ed. 1992).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 610–11.
119. See id. at 56, 65 ("Some equitable remedies are restitutionary, in money or
otherwise. Most often, however, equitable remedies are coercive" and serve as a basis for
contempt if not followed).
120. See id. at 280 (distinguishing disgorgement from traditional legal damages: "[A]
recovery [of defendant’s gains] would not be a recovery of damages because it would be
measured by the defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss").
121. Id. at 65.
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Emergency Price Control Act explains the equitable nature of
disgorgement, which scores of cases have cited and applied in a broad array
of underlying causes of action:
When the Administrator seeks restitution . . . he asks the Court to act in
the public interest by restoring the status quo and ordering the return of
that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant. Such action is
within the recognized power and within the highest tradition of a court
of equity.122

The Supreme Court weighed in again in favor of an equitable label, due to
disgorgement’s basis in restitution and its incidental connection or
intertwinement with injunctive relief.123 Other examples of an equity
classification include disgorgement as a statutory remedy for infringement
of intellectual property rights124 (although this remedy is unfortunately no
longer available for patent law).125 Also, a federal district court interpreted
the Lanham Act to permit plaintiff’s recovery of defendant’s profits
pursuant to equity principles and, accordingly, denied defendant’s request
for a jury trial.126 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has also plainly held that "[r]estitution for the disgorgement of
unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury."127
122. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946).
123. See Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 568–71 (1990) (finding plaintiff union
members entitled to a jury trial on their suit against union for breach of duty of fair
representation, despite the many "equitable" traits of the remedy sought).
124. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J.
2001) (granting Castrol disgorgement of profits on its unfair competition and false
advertising (Lanham Act) claims against Pennzoil); see also United States v. Rx Depot, Inc.,
438 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Section 332 of the FDCA [granting enforcement
powers to federal courts] invokes the equity jurisdiction of courts, using the same statutory
language the Supreme Court construed in Mitchell [v. Robert de Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361
U.S. 288 (1960),] to authorize all traditional equitable remedies."). The Rx Depot court then
declared that "[d]isgorgement is a traditional equitable remedy." Id.
125. See generally Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies
in Patent Law, supra note 80 (demonstrating the faulty Supreme Court logic interpreting the
elimination of disgorgement in the Patent Act Amendment and making the case for
restitutionary disgorgement’s reemergence as a valid, alternative remedy for patent
violations).
126. See Castrol, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 344 ("Pennzoil’s argument that it was deprived of
its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is . . . legally erroneous. A plain reading of the
Lanham Act remedy section unqualifiedly weighs against Pennzoil’s interpretation that they
are entitled to a jury trial on the disgorgement of profits issue. . . . Furthermore, the
language of this section makes no mention of a trial by jury.").
127. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying
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Given the likelihood that a plaintiff alleging breach of contract will
plead alternatively for damages or disgorgement, a court may view the
question of the law-equity classification (and, thus, the jury trial right) as
blurred. One plaintiff in a trademark infringement action unsuccessfully
attempted this argument, but the failure may have been due to the plaintiff’s
abandonment of the alternative claim for damages in its amended
complaint.128 The court’s reasoning for the denial of the blurring theory
(and thus the jury trial right) demonstrates the strong equitable pulls of
disgorgement:
[A] claim for damages seeks, and should be recognized as seeking, relief
different from a claim for unjust profits. It is quite possible a plaintiff
seeking unjust enrichment from a defendant may not have been
damaged at all by the defendant’s wrongful actions. In a trademark
infringement action, for example, a plaintiff may actually have
benefitted from a defendant’s advertising or promotion of a product
similar to plaintiff’s product because of increased consumer demand for
the product. In such a case, the plaintiff may not have suffered any
damages; yet the law still entitles him to recover the defendant’s
wrongful profits. Thus, because a claim for profits seeks relief
recognized by the Seventh Amendment as fundamentally different from a
claim for damages, the cases relied upon by American Cyanamid—
involving claims for both damages and unjust profits—cannot be
interpreted as blurring the two claims and rendering legal an otherwise
purely equitable claim for profits.
The distinction between American Cyanamid’s claims for damages and
profits is not simply semantic. What does American Cyanamid give up
by abandoning its claim for damages—the right to prove an injury for
which, if infringement is proved, the law allows recovery of damages[?]
Although American Cyanamid seeks money, it does not seek money for
its injury; rather, it seeks the amount by which Sterling Drug was
enriched from infringing on American Cyanamid’s trademark. In
substance, American Cyanamid seeks a determination whether Sterling
Drug was enriched because of an infringement and, if so, an order
requiring restitution of such money from Sterling Drug to American
Cyanamid. These demands are equitable in nature. Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s request for disgorgement of profits because (1) plaintiff had elected damages at
law by requesting a jury, (2) the district court submitted three claims—breach of a
confidential relationship, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation—to
the jury, and (3) the jury awarded damages for each).
128. See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784, 785, 789 (D.N.J.
1986) (considering a jury trial but ultimately denying the right given plaintiff’s pursuit of
restitutionary disgorgement).
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determination of whether there is a right to a jury trial in this case is not
decided merely on the choice of the words or phrasing used in the
pleadings.129

Scholars have also recognized the difficulty of definitively labeling
disgorgement as either legal or equitable.130 Further, all too often, courts
attach the equity label in a conclusory fashion, but not without scholarly
criticism.131 Unfortunately, the weight of such scholarly treatments is
129. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). The court also explores the import of the Supreme
Court’s remarks in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), about distinguishing
between a bona fide prayer for relief and a semantic maneuver to gain or avoid a jury trial.
Sterling Drug, 649 F. Supp. at 787. Notably, the Court in Dairy Queen reasoned that
plaintiff’s claim for an accounting of profits was, in essence, a legal claim for damages:
We find it unnecessary to resolve this ambiguity in the respondents’ complaint
because we think it plain that their claim for a money judgment is a claim
wholly legal in its nature however the complaint is construed. The respondents’
contention that this money claim is "purely equitable" is based primarily upon
the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an "accounting," rather than in
terms of an action for "debt" or "damages." But the constitutional right to trial
by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the
pleadings.
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477–78 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has re-emphasized
the import of the nature of the relief actually sought versus creative characterization to gain
access to available remedies under ERISA. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220 (2002) (affirming dismissal of suit under Section 502 of the
ERISA upon finding that plaintiffs were, in reality, seeking legal damages rather than an
equitable remedy authorized by the statute). For additional cases after Great-West that place
emphasis on the real relief sought over cloaking and faux-garb on remedy claims, see Coan
v. Kaufman, 333 F. Supp. 2d 14, 25 (D. Conn. 2004); Scholastic Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Conn. 2005); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., No. 96-3587, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29261, at *36 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2005).
130. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LANGER, JOHN T. MORGAN & DAVID BELT, 12 CONN. PRAC.,
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES § 6.9 (1st ed. 2003) ("The question of whether the remedy of
disgorgement is legal or equitable is complex. In general, restitution for unjust enrichment
may be awarded in an action at law."). The treatise surveys a number of cases under the
FTC Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.) and California’s Unfair Competition Law, which it places
in three conflicting categories: cases that (1) authorized disgorgement as an available legal
remedy, (2) permitted disgorgement only as ancillary equitable relief, or (3) denied as
unavailable the remedy of nonrestitutionary disgorgement. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and
Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 48
(2007) (criticizing a lower court for "ignor[ing] the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion
that, like restitution, disgorgement can be either a remedy at law or in equity"). Roach notes,
"In essence, the Northern District of Illinois identified three different types of remedies:
restitution in equity, restitution at law and disgorgement. Rather than define the exact nature
of disgorgement and identify the key characteristics of disgorgement that qualify it as a
remedy in equity, the opinion attaches a label and effectively assumes away the issue." The
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unclear given that the underlying cases involve statutory interpretation
unlike a claim of disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract.
Contracts case law exists in which disgorgement-like remedies are
awarded,132 but the cases shed little, if any, light on the proper treatment of
the remedy. Contracts courts have consistently failed to either characterize
the remedy as disgorgement,133 rely on restitution and unjust enrichment
doctrine, or consider the jury trial right issue. For example, courts speak in
terms of expectancy, but when left without an appropriate market measure,
they use the profit earned by the breaching party as the measure, which
effectuates a disgorgement.134 Accordingly, the Restatement offers the
disgorgement section as a new rule for disgorging profits from
opportunistic breach of contract based on unjust enrichment principles. If
the overt combination of breach of contract and disgorgement is new, then
historical analysis provides little to no guidance.
A pure, functional, remedial analysis likely supports a finding that the
shifting of promisor’s gain to the promisee is a legal money judgment that
ought to trigger the parties’ jury-trial right. The Restatement comments
argue for this interpretation and assert that disgorgement does not operate
on the promisor; it does not command any act on the promisor’s part.135
Rather, disgorgement will resemble a damage remedy that is enforceable
via traditional damage routes like writs of execution. Further, the
Restatement urges throughout that the restitutionary disgorgement remedy
lower court opinion that failed to heed the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion is SEC v.
Buntrock, No. 02C2180, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at *7–9 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2004)
(concluding that "generic" disgorgement is an equitable remedy). The Seventh Circuit
opinion handed down after Great-West is SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir.
2002) ("Disgorgement is another name for restitution . . . and restitution, as we have noted
in several non-SEC cases, is both a legal and an equitable remedy."); see also George P.
Roach, Counter-Restitution For Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271 (2011).
132. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest In Contract Law, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 559, 578–97 (2006) (discussing cases acknowledging a disgorgement interest in
remedying breach of contract).
133. See Farnsworth, supra note 71, at 1371 ("[C]ourts have often applied traditional
damage rules in such a way as to favor disgorgement. They have done this first, by looking
to market price rather than the buyer’s actual cover price and, second, by looking to the
seller’s actual resale price as evidence of market price . . . .").
134. Id.; see also Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1956) (calculating plaintiff
salon owner’s damages as the difference between stylist’s salary before and after stylist
breached contract by joining new hair salon at higher pay).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. c.
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be viewed as legal rather than equitable. Given the historical, equitable
roots of disgorgement in other substantive areas, however, courts and
lawyers may continue to view disgorgement as ancillary to equitable
remedies, such as accounting for profits. The Restatement appears to favor
"legal" characterization (with the accompanying jury trial right) so that the
disgorgement remedy will avoid the fears of unbounded judicial
discretionPalmtree Justice via the "Chancellor’s clumsy foot."136 In
addition, defendants may well fear that juries will seize on disgorgement to
deter perceived opportunism and honor promise-keeping. The drafters hope
the Restatement’s cabining of the disgorgement rule will bound jury
decision making.137
If disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract is equitable,
should courts require a plaintiff to establish inadequacy to attain a
disgorgement remedy? The Restatement asserts "no" in its explicit
rejection of the inadequacy prerequisite.138 It declares that raising this
anachronistic barrier for any unjust enrichment claim is fundamentally
flawed: "Courts too often recite that one of the requirements of a claim
based on unjust enrichment is absence of an adequate legal remedy. This
spurious proposition rests on an obvious fallacy, and it obscures what courts
are actually doing when they invoke it."139 Thus, even if the restitutionary
remedy is equitable, courts should not bar remedial access based on the
availability of legal remedies. The pre-publication draft Restatement
attempted to further barricade disgorgement from equity’s ghosts by
declaring it legal.140 The final, published version of the Restatement is
silent on the classification of disgorgement.
136. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Deleting "Palmtree Justice" does not change anything. See Sarah Worthington,
Majority Rule: When Can Minorities Cry Foul?, 40 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 11) ("[T]he House of Lords decided in broad terms that unfettered discretion
is something that the law does not admit.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. f ("The cumulative requirements of § 39 will
exclude the great majority of contractual defaults."). The Comment elaborates by noting that
"[t]he scope of [§ 39] is further restricted by the requirement that breach be deliberate—
thereby excluding cases in which breach results from the defendant’s inadvertence,
negligence, or unsuccessful attempt at performance." Id.
138. Id. § 4(2).
139. Id. § 4 cmt. e.
140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 7, 2010) (warning that
it would be a grave mistake to regard the newly formulated rule of disgorgement in § 39 as
"equitable").
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If courts treat disgorgement as legal, it is plain that the Restatement
commands rejection of the inadequacy prerequisite for all unjust
enrichment remedies, including disgorgement.141 Well, it is plain in
Section 4(2). Plain, at least, in the main text, but the clarity fades in the
Restatement’s comments: "Section 4(2) is stated in broad terms, without
reference to Section 39, in order to convey as clearly as possible a general
truth about the modern law of restitution and unjust enrichment; but
Section 4(2) may be qualified by reference to Section 39(1), to the extent of
any perceived inconsistency."142 Unfortunately, the operational section for
the remedy of disgorgement for opportunistic breach, Section 39, is also
unnecessarily confusing on this score. The blackletter portion dangerously
resurrects remnants of equitable rhetoric:
If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting
promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate
protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a
claim to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of
breach.143

It further reiterates disgorgement’s distinction from damage remedies:
"Restitution by the rule of this section is an alternative to a remedy in
damages."144
The comments, notably, draw a parallel between
disgorgement and the equitable remedy of specific performance.145 Despite
the italicized language in both quotes, the Restatement assures that
disgorgement for opportunistic breach is legal and not an extraordinary
equitable remedy146 and that plaintiffs seeking disgorgement need not
overcome an inadequacy-of-legal-remedies hurdle.
Is the Restatement speaking out of both sides of its mouth? Did
drafting compromises lead to mixed messages? The next section analyzes
how lawyers and judges may decipher such competing signals. It also
urges a normative approach that will help exorcize equity’s ghosts,
eliminate false remedial hierarchies, and focus the debate on the appropriate
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)§ 4(2) (liberating all unjust enrichment remedies from
showing the inadequacy of available remedies at law).
142. Id. § 4 cmt. e.
143. Id. § 39(1) (emphasis added).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 39 cmt. c.
146. See id. ("Disgorgement is a monetary remedy enforceable only against defendant’s
property, not by attempting to coerce the defendant’s conduct, and the value of the judgment
is the same for each side.").
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substantive limits of restitutionary disgorgement for opportunistic breach of
contract.
IV. Inadequacy’s Inadequacy for Restitution’s Contractual Disgorgement
Remedy
A. Inadequacy by Any Other Name Does Not Smell So Sweet
Restitution’s contractual disgorgement remedy for opportunistic
breach of contract ensnares disgorgement in the language of equity by
resurrecting inadequacy with an "inadequate protection" analysis. With one
hand, the Restatement eschews the inadequacy-of-legal-remedies test, but
with the other it endorses a hurdle of "inadequate protection" of damage
remedies for access to the alternate remedy of disgorgement. The
Restatement recognizes the potential for misinterpretation:
The rule of § 39 . . . allowing disgorgement of profits realized by an
opportunistic breach of contract, inquires whether "the available damage
remedy affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual
entitlement. . . . " By inquiring whether "the available damage remedy
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement,"
the rule of § 39 echoes the functional question at the heart of the
traditional inquiry into adequacy of legal remedies.147

The Restatement admits the apparent inconsistency between
disgorgement’s inadequate protection requirement and the Restatement’s
abandonment of the inadequacy test for unjust enrichment remedies.148 The
operational disgorgement section reiterates the problematic resemblance to
equity’s inadequacy of legal remedies test and again warns against viewing
the new disgorgement rule as an equitable remedy subject to anachronistic
jurisdictional hurdles of equity.149 The Restatement reiterates its intent to
shed the inadequacy prerequisite for all remedies based on unjust
enrichment: "Properly interpreted, there is no conflict between the

147. Id. § 4 cmt. e, reporter’s note e.
148. Id. § 4 reporter’s note e ("The final paragraph of Comment E acknowledges a
possible inconsistency between §§ 4(2) and 39(1).").
149. Id. § 39 cmt. c ("Although [this] inquiry . . . resembles the traditional threshold test
for equitable jurisdiction, stated in terms of ‘adequacy of remedy at law,’ it would be
erroneous and anachronistic to regard this newly-formulated rule as a species of equitable
relief, or to limit its availability by reference to obsolete jurisdictional boundaries.").
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requirements of § 39 and the general proposition of § 4(2)."150 The problem
lies in whether lawyers and judges will properly interpret the "inadequate
protection" language shrouding this new disgorgement remedy for
opportunistic breach.
Faith in proper interpretation is difficult to muster.
Proper
interpretation is unlikely given the basic misperceptions of unjust
enrichment and the lasting pull of equitable framing of unjust enrichment
and continuing rhetorical force of the inadequacy of legal remedies
prerequisite. The commentary in the Restatement may do little to ensure
proper interpretation due to its conclusory assertions in an already muddled
landscape.
The Restatement’s blackletter aims to secure proper interpretation
through explicit construction of inadequate protection. It defines when
inadequate protection exists:
A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the promisee’s
contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not
permit the promisee to acquire the full equivalent to the promised
performance in a substitute transaction.151

Will this section sufficiently distinguish inadequate protection from the
inadequacy of legal remedies prerequisite? I have critiqued this section
elsewhere, based on the promisee’s likely sense of inadequate protection
versus a court’s interpretation of full equivalent,152 such as the
Restatement’s nonconforming widget illustration.153
In the widget illustration, Seller confronts an unexpected price increase
in manufacturing and then deliberately delivers nonconforming widgets and
profits by saving $50,000, but Buyer’s remedy will be limited to "an
ordinary damage remedy" of $10,000 (the difference in value between the
promised widgets and the delivered nonconforming widgets) rather than a
disgorgement of the $50,000.154 Disgorgement, per the illustration, is
unavailable because "there is no reason to conclude that Buyer’s entitlement
150. Id. § 39 cmt. c (emphasis added).
151. Id. § 39(2).
152. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 80, at 1021–24 (analyzing
Restatement illustration formerly numbered 13 (now 16)).
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 illus. 16, reporter’s note i (basing the illustration
on "a hypothetical example designed to emphasize the point that a breach of contract may be
deliberate and profitable (not to mention ‘efficient’) without being opportunistic").
154. Id. § 39 cmt. i, illus. 16.
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is inadequately protected by an ordinary damage remedy."155
The
illustration asserts that "[d]amages measured by difference in value give
Buyer ‘a full equivalent to the promised performance,’ and the case is one
in which specific performance would have been denied."156
Given the underlying subject matter of the illustrationgoods,
widgetscommodification into money damages is palatable, if not
expected. Yet, what if Buyer alleges inadequate protection because the
difference in value measure will not yield the full equivalent to the
promised performance in fact? Is the inadequate protection analysis distinct
from asking whether an adequate legal remedy exists? Buyer, who may
desire disgorgement or specific performance, is effectively denied such a
remedy because Buyer must accept that a difference-in-value measure will
be adequate. The difference-in-value measure may be a form of an
expectancy measure,157 but it does not ensure Buyer’s contractual
entitlement.
My critique does not require that we provide Buyer the disgorgement
remedy, which may constitute an after-the-fact, monetized form of specific
performance. Rather, the challenge is whether the inadequate protection
requirement will likely drag lawyers and courts into anachronistic
inadequacy-of-legal-damages analysis and unnecessarily reinforce remedial
hierarchies. If disgorgement is inappropriate as a remedy for the widget
Buyer in the illustration, we should center the debate on substantive reasons
for denying the remedy, such as in cases in which the breaching behavior
does not rise to the level of wrongfulness we wish to deter.158 For example,
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Expectancy can be under-compensatory. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage
Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 405 (1990) (critiquing the judicial trend of awarding punitive
damages for breach of contract but not enforcing liquidated damages clauses or granting
specific performance as unfaithful to contracting parties’ expectation interest); Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 305 (1979) (arguing
specific performance should be available on request because it would better meet the goals
of compensation and expectancy).
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. i ("Facts along these lines are a staple of
commentators’ accounts of circumstances in which a party’s intentional breach of contract
should not be regarded as a wrong."). The Restatement cites Professor Laycock regarding
parallel examples in which courts denied specific performance on the basis of
disproportionate hardship to the promisor. Id. (citing LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 175–76 (1991)). Although Professor Laycock’s work effectively
shows that disproportionate hardship, not the irreparable injury rule, is the real reason that
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Seller’s breach may be deliberate and profitable but "committed only to
avert a larger loss."159 The touchstones for line drawing on the
restitutionary disgorgement remedy should be the breaching party’s
behavior, the need to promote promise keeping, and the interest in deterring
the particular type of breach in question.
To the extent that inadequate protection exists, it is not with respect to
the classic monetary remedy but, rather, it exists when a stronger party took
advantage of a less sophisticated party, at possibly two turns: (1) the
bargaining phase that left the less sophisticated party without a liquidated
damage clause, and (2) the pre-breach phase in which the promisor did not
renegotiate with Buyer but, instead, consciously took without asking. It is
for these reasons that a disgorgement remedy should be available. Yet,
given the newness of the rule of disgorgement for opportunistic breach in
America, it may be wise to cabin disgorgement to certain cases rather than
allowing it to be accessible on the non-breaching party’s prerogative. The
lines of limitation should focus on which breaches are worthy of deterrence
(i.e., which breaches are opportunistic).
B. A Normative Approach for Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Opportunistic Breach
The American restitution revival is an exciting time for restitution
scholars worldwide. It reengages our contribution to the global dialogue on
the appropriate boundaries of an artful, powerful body of unjust enrichment
law and remedies. In order for the new Restatement of restitution to make
the most splash, it is essential that its promise not be lost in clunky,
unfamiliar vernacular. One of the Restatement’s primary values is the
modernization and clarification of the language of the doctrine and its
remedies. The more vexing problem may well prove to be the shackles of
equity. Recognizing the pitfalls, the drafters sought to eradicate all
references to the law-equity divide from the project.160 The drafters
courts deny specific performance, courts often conduct an irreparable injury analysis under a
rubric in which the promisee must show entitlement to specific performance—what the
courts still deem an extraordinary remedy—in the face of the preferred expectancy measure.
Fortunately, the disproportionate hardship focus at least concentrates attention on the
breaching party, which more naturally comports with the restitutionary disgorgement
remedy.
159. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118–19 (4th ed. 1992).
160. Andrew Kull, Remarks at the Restitution Rollout Symposium (Feb. 25, 2011),
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succeeded with this endeavor with minor exceptions, such as the
constructive trust remedy, which has equitable roots that simply run too
deep.161
In the overarching frame, the Restatement may bend too dramatically in
its abandonment of equitable principlesall things flexible, discretionary,
and rooted in natural justice. The American law of restitution need not adopt
an anachronistic law-equity divide, but we would be wise to retain the beauty
and flexibility of the underlying doctrine. At its core, restitution doctrine
requires that one be unjustly enriched. "Unjustly" means that either a judge
(if the equitable historical characterization sticks) or a jury (if the legal
conception prevails) must determine whether it is "unjust" for a breaching
party to retain the benefits without paying the non-breaching party. That
determination inherently calls for a sense of justice, of right and wrong, in
consideration of the whole context.
Accordingly, the introductory
definitional provision of the Restatement should not be interpreted as devoid
of justice considerations. Rather, interpretation requires considerations of
justice, but those considerations should be principled and evaluated with the
helpful guidance of the whole body of the Restatement with all of its
blackletter, illustrations, and commentary on the categories of wrongdoing
that restitution law seeks to deter.
With respect to disgorgement, the Restatement eschews the equity
rubric with one breath, while utilizing an inadequate protection requirement
that may raise equity’s ghosts in the minds of interpreters. Given that it is too
late for a substantive change to the text of the disgorgement rule, courts and
scholars would be wise to focus the analysis on the appropriate level of
conscious wrongdoing, coupled with profiting, to warrant application of the
disgorgement remedy. In the American contract law tradition, the debate
regarding the proper scope of disgorgement liability should encompass
recognition of contract law’s varied, and sometimes competing, goals:
predictability, certainty, the flow of the wheels of commerce, efficiency,
flexibility, and promise keeping. Restitution law adds the deterrence element
and encourages renegotiation for breaches of contract that are at the ethical
margins, rather than garden-variety, tolerable breaches. Drawing this line
will be difficult, but it must be done. I maintain that we should engage in the
substantive line drawing process rather than focus on the promisee’s ability to
establish that legal remedies will adequately protect her contractual
available at http://law.wlu.edu/news/archivemultimedia.asp.
161. Id.
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entitlement. American law should follow the Commonwealth and other
countries towards less rigidity on the hierarchy of a promisee’s access to
remedies and focus more on whether access to supercompensatory remedies,
like disgorgement, should be available as a tool to encourage promise
keeping and deter conscious taking without asking.
To the extent that disgorgement cannot shake an equitable remedy
characterization, judges should use bounded discretion. They should base
recovery in disgorgement on the case illustrations of the Restatement.
Although the Restatement cannot anticipate the creative opportunism of
future breaching parties, judges can study the collection of restatement cases
across disciplines to discern when the breaching behavior rises to the level of
wrongfulness justifying stripping gains and reallocating those gains to the
nonbreaching party. If the Restatement conception of disgorgement as legal
prevails, judges should exercise their gatekeeping functions on the issues of
deliberateness and profitability, and juries should award disgorgement if they
are convinced that plaintiff’s proof of opportunism warrants restitutionary
recovery.
V. Keep on Merging and Embrace Disgorgement Remedy for Opportunistic
Breach
America’s restitution revival should embrace the justice and fairness
roots of unjust enrichment. At the same time, the restitution revival must
carefully exorcize equity’s ghosts in order to avoid the further
misconceptions of the doctrine and faulty conclusions causing unnecessary
denials of unjust enrichment claims and remedies. The Restatement project
admirably streamlines the language of unjust enrichment but, at times, strains
to cabin the reach of new, provocative sections like disgorgement. Efforts to
compromise and allay fears may result in unfortunate entanglement with
equity’s ghosts, especially the irreparable injury rule.
The wise approach is to avoid lingering in the purgatory of equity’s
remnants. Instead: "When the ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice
clanking their medieval chains the proper course of the judges is to pass
through them undeterred."162 As lawyers, judges, and scholars offer
162. United Australia v. Barclays Bank, [1941] A.C. 28–29 (H.L.) (lamenting legal
restitution’s historical path from the contract doctrine of assumpsit, which, over time,
required legal fictions that implied a "debt" and a "promise to repay"). Lord Atkin
remarked, "These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet requirements
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important early interpretations of disgorgement’s boundaries in American
law, let the focus be on the set of breaches warranting deterrence and
justifying the promotion of promise keeping and prevention of unjust
enrichment.

of the law as to forms of action which have now disappeared should not in these days be
allowed to affect actual rights." Id.

